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Abstract 
 
Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity 
value, which verify three properties: Linearity, Symmetry and Efficiency, and the null player 
axiom. On the other hand, the interpretation of the two values is usually related on the 
marginal contribution of a player that joins a coalition.  
The paper generalizes the approach. First, the marginal contribution concept is extended to 
any valued solution that satisfies the three properties. Second, the null player axiom is also 
generalized and it is shown that any single valued solution satisfying the three properties is 
uniquely characterized by a null player axiom. In particular, the paper provides new 
interpretations, in the sense of marginal contribution, for other well-known single values such 
as Egalitarian value and Consensus value and also offers the opportunity for recasting in 
extensive form some well-established results. 
 
Keywords: TU-games, single valued solution, Shapley value, marginal contribution, null 
player axiom. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, we study, in an extensive form, the problem of sharing the joint gains of 
cooperation and we characterize in a constructive interpretational approach, the whole set of 
values for TU-games that verify the three properties: linearity, efficiency and symmetry. 
We focus on the interpretation based on the marginal contribution concept such as found in 
Shapley value and Solidarity value. 
The Shapley value takes all coalitions into account and computes for each player the expected 
marginal contribution. In this way, the Shapley value attributes to the entrant player the whole 
marginal contribution due to its entrance. In fact, this could be debatable since the marginal 
contribution is jointly created by the entire coalition but not by the entrant player solely. 
According to this reasoning, it may be exaggerated in some cases, to give a later entrant the 
whole marginal value. 
The Solidarity value, on the other hand, considers the same scheme of marginal contribution 
and also computes for each player, the expected marginal contribution. But the difference here 
is that, the marginal contribution due to the entrance of a player is equally shared by all 
members of the coalition. Of course there is also critique of this approach. The natural 
question that arises at this case is: do all members of the coalition merit the same values as the 
later entrance? 
These questions open up the problem of sharing the marginal contribution among the later 
entrant and the incumbents (original members of the coalition). 
The paper considers the same line as the Shapley value and the Solidarity value to solve the 
problem. The average marginal contribution scheme is maintained, but we propose to share 
the marginal contribution to the entrant and the incumbents according to the cardinality of the 
coalition. When a player joins a coalition, he or she takes a part (fraction or multiple) of the 
marginal contribution and the remainder is equally distributed among the original members of 
the coalition. The formulation of the part taken by the entrant could change from a coalition to 
another but are always the same for two coalitions with equal cardinality. Furthermore, we 
accept the part of the entrant as being a negative or positive multiple of the marginal 
contribution. If the part of the entrant is greater than the entire marginal contribution, the 
incumbents will lose in the cooperation with the entrant and they will gain in the opposite 
case.  
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Of course, the procedure basically generalizes the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. 
Also, we obtain new interpretations for others well established solution concepts such as the 
so called Consensus value and Egalitarian value. According to our approach, the Consensus 
value considers that, the part taken by the entrant is   
 
 
 
 
  times its marginal contribution in case 
the coalition cardinality is 2, and equally shares the marginal contribution with the 
incumbents in other cases. While in the Egalitarian value, the entrant player takes nothing and 
the whole marginal contribution is equally share between the incumbents. 
 The paper shows that our procedure coincides with the whole set of the value for TU-games, 
that are linear, efficient and symmetric. In other words, we demonstrate that every value 
satisfying the three properties can be seen as a procedure to split the marginal contributions 
between the entrant and the incumbents as we have described above; and conversely. The null 
player axiom is also generalized and we show that any single valued solution satisfying the 
three properties is associated to a null player model. 
The question of finding a characteristic expression  of value that are linear, efficient and 
symmetric has been recently solve by L. Hermandez, R. Juarez, and Sanchez (2008) and C. 
Chameni and N. Andjiga (2008). The authors gave interpretations for their formulas but they 
did not relate it to the problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation.  
The paper is organized following three sections in addition to the present one. Section 2 
contains some preliminaries and introduces the new entity which reflects the total gain due to 
the cooperation of a player in a coalition. In section 3, we state the main results of the paper. 
We show how replacing the marginal contribution of the Shapley value by the total gain due 
to the coalitional membership of a player yields a characterization of the whole class of values 
that satisfy linearity, symmetry and efficiency. The general null player axiom is introduced 
and the discrimination via the axiom is demonstrated. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.   Preliminaries  
An n-person game in characteristic function form or a transferable utility game (TU game) is 
a pair       where              is the set of   players and   is a mapping        
such that         
For any subset (coalition) of  ,      is the worth of coalition   when all the players in   
collaborate. The number of elements of   is denoted    . 
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  denoted the linear space of n-person transferable utility game   on  :  
                    
It is well known that   is a      dimension linear space. 
A value                            on  , is a vector-valued mapping      
  
which uniquely determines, for each    , a distribution of wealth or payoff available to the 
players           through their participation in the game      . 
We are ready to introduce basic axioms widely used in the literature. Efficiency requires that 
the payoffs assigned to players sum to all benefits generated by forming the grand coalition. 
Symmetry requires that the only information of players in determining their payoffs is 
summarized in their participation through the game    so that if two players make the same 
contribution in  , then they should receive the same amount. Finally, Linearity requires that 
the payoffs assigned to players in a linear combination of two games are the corresponding 
linear combination of the payoffs assigned to them in each of the two games separately. 
- Linearity 
  is linear if for any games       and for any      : 
                      
 
- Symmetry 
  is symmetric if  for all    , for any automorphism   of  ,               . 
We recall that   is an automorphism of the game     ,if              for each 
coalition      
- Efficiency 
  is efficient if for all    ,               . 
Next, we introduce a new entity which reflects the total gain due to the cooperation of a 
player in a coalition. To do this, we define for any non empty coalition     with      , 
for any     and for any fixed    , the quantity 
        
         
                  
      
   
                          
                                                                                                      
      (1) 
Where             is any real sequence satisfying       . 
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The interpretation of   
        can be obtained as followed: 
When the player   becomes a member of coalition  , he/she shares the marginal contribution 
              due to its entrance, with the original members of  . He/She takes a part 
(fraction or multiple) of this quantity, that is                   and the rest is equally 
distributed among the original members    , each of them takes 
      
   
               
       means that, the player always takes the whole marginal contribution when he/she is 
alone in the coalition. 
Thus,    
        is the total gain of the player   due to its  -membership when the successive 
entrances of all players   in      are considered. 
It is worth noting that   
        has the same expression for coalitions with the same size. On 
the other hand, the coefficient       for      could be taken as any real number, negative or 
positive, greater than 1 or not. Thus,   
        could be greater or less than              
If   
                     player   offers some part of its marginal contribution (it is 
possible that   lost more than the whole marginal contribution) to others members of the 
coalition. If in contrary   
                    , player   benefits from its    
 -membership by obtaining more than its marginal contribution. 
Let us now focus on some algebraic properties of the entity    
       . We considerer the 
particular cases where               ;        (   is any real number)  and denote 
the corresponding   
         by   
    . 
Proposition 1: For any game      , for any coalition     with      , if   is any real 
number,             , and             real sequences such that                  . 
1)   
                      
               
        
2) Consider the product         
            
                
    then 
              
            
               
     
3)   
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Proof: Since 2) and 3) can directly be obtained from 1), we only give the proof of 1). 
-  For     
  
                   = 
                             
                   
   
                     
                     
      
   
                      
   
   
            
                                 
      
   
                      
   
   
                     
=                     
      
   
                      + 
                         
      
   
                      
=    
               
        
- For    , 
   
                                           
               
       .  
3.  Definitions and main results 
We define the value of the TU-game       by replacing in the Shapley value expression, the 
marginal contribution when a player joins a coalition S by the total gain defined in (1): 
     
         
            
  
   
     
  
       
 
   
                        
 
Indeed,    defines a family of values based on the parameter   where             is any real 
sequence satisfying       . One of the main results of this paper is to show that, the family 
coincides with the set of linear, symmetric and efficient values. But, before tackle the issue, 
let us focus on algebraic properties of    and some computational classical examples. 
The following properties are straightforward from proposition 1: 
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Proposition 2: For any game      , for any player      if   is any real number,  
            , and             real sequences such that                  .  
1)   
                 
            
     
2)   
          
                
3)   
                        
Where    and   are respectively the Shapley and the Egalitarian value       
    
 
  
It is clear that the procedure generalizes the well established values such as Shapley value, 
Solidarity value and Consensus value; they corresponding             are computed in the 
following table.  
Value Name                  … …      Interpretation 
Shapley 1 1 … 1 … 1 1 
The entrant player takes the whole marginal 
contribution and gives nothing to the 
incumbents 
Equal division 
or Egalitarian  
1 0 … 0 … 0 0 
The entrant player takes nothing and the 
whole marginal contribution is equally share 
between the incumbents, except the case 
where he is alone. 
Solidarity 1 
 
 
 … 
 
 
 … … 
 
 
 
The entrant player equally shares the marginal 
contribution with the incumbents. 
Consensus 1 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
The entrant takes 
 
 
 times the marginal 
contribution in case the coalition cardinality is 
2, and takes half the marginal contribution in 
other cases 
C.I.S.   or 
Equal surplus 
1     0 … 0 … 0 
The entrant takes     times the marginal 
contribution in case the coalition cardinality is 
2, and takes nothing in other cases. 
 
Note that a similar table is found in C. Chameni and N. Andjiga (2008) but with the difference 
that the coefficients, though mathematically close, have neither the same substance nor the 
same interpretation. Here the first column of the table is full of one’s while in the referenced 
tables it is the last column which is ones. 
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We can now state our first main result: 
Theorem1: Let   be a value on  ,   is linear, symmetric and efficient if and only if  there 
exist a unique sequence             with        such that: 
                                                   
       
            
  
   
     
  
       . 
 In others words,   can be seen as a procedure to distribute the marginal contribution among 
the entrant and the original members of a coalition.  
 
Proof: For our result, we will use the following lemma recently established in the literature  
(L. Hermandez, R. Juarez, and Sanchez (2008)) or  (C. Chameni and N. Andjiga (2008)). 
 
Lemma 1: A value   on   is linear, symmetric and efficient if and only if  there exist a unique 
sequence               such that: 
                                                              
      
    
 
   
            
  
             
     
          
  
            
     
             (3) 
 
Thus, the proof of the theorem consists in breaking down the expression of   
       in (2) to 
obtain the expression (3). To do this, we evaluate in (2) the total coefficient of      for each 
coalition  . 
Consider a coalition   with       
 First,        ,   is the grand coalition and then    ; therefore,      is present in the 
two terms of the sum in   
       , so the total coefficient of      in (2) is   
                    
            
  
      
      
   
       
 
 
 . 
 
 Second,       , two alternatives are possible :  
 
-  If    ,       and can be also obtained of the form            with   n-1 possibilities 
for that, so the total coefficient of      in (2) is : 
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-    ,                                                         
 
            
  
     =  
          
  
      . 
 
 Third,       , there are also two alternatives: 
- If    ,   can be also obtained of the form         where          ; there are n-k 
possibilities for that, so the total coefficient of      in (2) is : 
 
 
            
  
                
          
  
        
 
      
            
  
      . 
 
- If               with         ,                                          
  
          
  
       
Finally, if     with        , the total coefficient of      is 
            
  
       and if 
     the total coefficient is  
          
  
      ; for    , the coefficient of      
 
 
 . 
It comes that, 
   
       
    
 
   
            
  
               
     
          
  
              
     
        
Hence,   
       can be put of the form (3) with the relation:  
                                                                                
Remark 1: It is worth noting that, the proof of lemma 1 clearly establishes a direct link 
between the two sequences               and          . This in particular offers the 
possibility for recasting, by using           ,all the properties (such as monotonicity, 
covariant property, duality etc.) found in the literature  and based on               . We will 
not focus on to the matter as we would like to go straight to our main results.   
Having generalized the marginal contribution concept, let us now examine the null player axiom 
introduced in both the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. Of course we start by a general 
definition of the null player.  
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Definition 1: 
 For any sequence                satisfying       , for any game         . A player     
is considered as     null player in the game       if for any coalition S                   
  
          . 
 
Remark 2: The     null player defined here joints together most of the null player models found 
in the literature. If                 , we obtain the null player of Shapley(1953) value; 
if       
 
 
          , it is the null player of Solidarity value (A.S.Nowack and Tadeusz 
Radzik ;1994) that is obtained and if                ;       , it is easy to check that 
we fall on the zero player that is the null player of the Egalitarian value ( René Van Den 
Brink, 2007). 
Next, we have the general null player axiom : 
A value   on   satisfies the     null player axiom, if      is a     null player in the game 
      then        . 
Our purpose now is to demonstrate the discriminatory property of the     null player axiom. In 
other words, we show that      is the unique value that satisfies linearity, efficiency, symmetric and 
the     null player axiom. 
To reach our goal, we need to state two lemmas as follows. The first lemma gives, for any  sequence 
               satisfying       , a basis    
             for the linear space   that 
can be considered as a canonical basis associated to the value   . 
Lemma 2: For any sequence                satisfying       , for any non empty coalition  , 
we consider  the game  
                      
      
    
      
   
                                  
                                               
                                              
        (4) 
Then the family      
            of games is a basis for the linear space . 
 
 Proof: 
The proof  is classical and will be led as made by  A.S.Nowack and Tadeusz Radzik (1994) in the case 
of Solidarity value. 
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Let   ,        ,with    
    , be a sequence containing all the non empty subsets of   
such that 1=                     . 
Consider the  x  matrix       
   defined by   
      
                    
It is clear that    is a triangle matrix with all diagonal entries equal to 1. Thus Det     and it is 
immediate that the family      
            constitutes a set of   linear independent 
vectors of  , thus a basis on  .                                                                               
Remark 3 : It might be interesting to explain the  source  of the basis      
           . In 
fact,   basically generalizes some well-known and classical basis found in the literature. For 
the sequence                 , it is easy to see that,    
  is the unanimity game 
associated to the coalition   ; thus   is the basis introduced by L.S.Shapley in the case of 
Shapley value. If     
 
 
           ,   
       
   
   
 
  
       
              
       and then   is the 
basis introduced by A.S.Nowack and Tadeusz Radzik in the case of Solidarity value. 
 
The second lemma establishes particular properties for the basis defined in (4). 
Lemma 3: For any sequence                satisfying       , for any non empty coalition 
 ,   
  has the following properties: 
1) For any player i     , for any coalition    , with     , 
               
        
      
   
    
       
2) Every player i       is     null in the game   
 .  
 
Proof: 
1) Consider a player i     ; for any coalition    , with      , 
 If    , then   
       
           and  the assertion is true. 
 If     then        and      . Two alternatives are possible 
a)       
           
         
      
   
        =   
      
   
      
      
   
           
=    
      
   
    
      . 
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b)       
Then        and   
         
  
     =    
        
     
      
      
   
      
      
   
    
      . 
 
2) For any player i      , for any coalition    , with      , we have: 
 If    ,  
-       
      , thus   
          
      . 
-     is impossible since    . 
 
 If    , 
-            for all j   , thus   
       
         
  
               
       
        
      
   
    
       
       
     
   
-     
                           
               
       
        
      
   
    
       
             
                               =   
           
       
      
   
   
            
 
 Since   
         
       for all      , and   
         for all     , 
 
              
        =   
           
       
      
   
         
       
                           =   
       
        
      
   
  
       
                                           =   
        
      
   
    
        
                                       = 0     according to the property 1) of the lemma.                           
 
We are now ready to state the second main result of the paper: 
Theorem 2:  Let  be a value on  ,   is linear, symmetric , efficient and  satisfies the     null 
player axiom  if and only if      . 
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Proof: 
Let   be a value on  ,  if       , it is clear that   is linear, symmetric , efficient and  satisfies 
the     null player axiom. 
Conversely.  If   is linear, symmetric, efficient and  satisfies the     null player axiom, then for 
any non empty coalition  , with       ; by efficiency ,symmetry  and 2) of lemma 3, we have: 
 
 
    
        
    
  
     
 
         
                              
      
Thus,   and    coincide on the basis B=   
            ; therefore     .    
 
Theorem 2 clearly generalizes the case of Shapley value and Solidarity value. On the other hand, the 
proof of the theorem suggests an extension of its assertion and we actually deal with the issue.  Let us 
denote     
                                      , then we have the following result. 
 
Theorem 3: Let  and   be any two values on         are linear, symmetric, and efficient. 
 Then,    =   if and only if   and   coincide on   
     for any    . 
 
Proof:  
Following the proof of theorem 2, we lead to   and   coincide on the basis      
         
  ;  thus   =       
 
Corollary:  Let  and   be any two values on         are linear, symmetric and efficient. 
Then, for any    , for any reel number a, 
              (               for any          null player i)            
  
Proof:  
If i   
                   =              
     since   
        Hence  and    
        coincide on   
    ; thus            .  
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Note that the corollary may be useful for characterizing the class of solutions values that are obtained 
as convex combinations of others values (see Brink, R. Van Den and Yukihiko Funaki, 2008). 
 
4.  Conclusion: 
The class of values for transferable utility games defined on       that are simultaneously linear, 
symmetric and efficient is wide and defines a       dimension affine space. It contains, among 
others, the well-known values such as Shapley value, Solidarity value, Egalitarian value and 
Consensus value etc. A better understanding patterns of the class of values is essential to understand 
the difference (similarity) among them and the difference among the members in the class of values 
and others values.  
In this paper we have outlined the common expression of values which satisfy the three properties. In 
particular, we have obtained that every value in the class can be put in the random order form, similar 
to the well-known form of the Shapley value and Solidarity value. In other words, we have 
demonstrated that every value satisfying the three properties can be seen as a procedure to 
distribute the marginal contributions between the player who joins a coalition and the initial 
members of the coalition. The generalization of the null player axiom has been established 
and we have shown that every value in the class is connected to a null player model. The 
discrimination by the treatment of null players has been studied; and we have shown that: the answer 
to the question What does a value give to null players? Uniquely characterizes the value. Finally the 
paper offers the opportunity for recasting in extensive form some well-established results such 
as those concerning the characterization of the class of solutions values that are obtained as convex 
combinations of others values. 
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